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Abstract 
This paper examines whether the export decision of firms is affected by their ownership structure, 
specifically it looks at whether family control is an obstacle to entering foreign markets. The 
underlying assumption is that family firms are risk averse. Risk aversion may be an obstacle to 
entering foreign markets, as far as these are perceived as more volatile and risky than the domestic 
one, particularly when such choice entices bearing relatively high sunk costs. We develop an 
illustrative theoretical model that shows how the combination between high risk aversion and low 
initial productivity may hinder family firms’ decision to enter foreign markets, particularly distant 
ones. The empirical analysis, based on a detailed panel data set of Italian firms covering the years 
from 1995 to 2003, confirms such predictions by showing that family controlled firms do indeed 
export less than other type of companies even after controlling for firm heterogeneity in productivity, 
size, technology and access to credit. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The ability of a firm to operate in a foreign market is largely a function of its own characteristics, 
namely its technology, the skill mix of its personnel, as well as its ownership, governance and 
organizational structure. When new opportunities open up abroad, the firm will respond by 
adjusting some of the factors that impinge on its competitiveness in foreign markets. Other factors, 
including its ownership structure, will be harder to change, particularly in the short run. 
 
This paper takes a close look at the case of family firms. The key question we seek to address is 
whether these companies face different sets of incentives, compared say to widely owned firms, 
when entering a foreign market as exporters.  
 
Family firms are widespread across Europe as well as in the US. In Italy family control is the 
dominant form of ownership in the corporate sector, with no substantial changes in this feature in 
the last couple of decades (Giacomelli and Trento, 2005). In France two thirds of listed firms are 
controlled either by the founder or his heirs (Sraer and Thesmar, 2006). Families control 45% of 
voting blocks of listed companies in Austria and 32% in Germany (Becht and Mayer, 2001). In the 
US large listed corporations like Wal-Mart or Ford are family controlled (Perez-Gonzalez, 2006). 
 
The link between family firms and export has not been explored yet. On the one hand, many papers 
have analysed theoretically and empirically how family ownership affects performance in general 
(Caselli and Gennaioli, 2003, Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer, 2003, Perez-Gonzalez, 2006, Sraer and 
Thesmar, 2006, Favero et al 2007, Bertrand and Schoar, 2006), but none whether it also influences 
the decision to enter export markets and internationalise activities. On the other hand, several papers 
by Marin and Verdier (2006 and 2003) relate export performance to the degree of decentralisation 
of the governance of the firm, but they do not deal directly with the ownership structure.  
 
Why, then, is it important to analyse how the structure of ownership of firms affects their 
performance in the international market?  In this paper we focus on risk aversion. The shareholder’s 
objective in widely held firms is the maximization of expected profits. Shareholders are assumed to 
be able to diversify their portfolio in different (and uncorrelated) activities and, as a result, only 
require managers to maximize the expected value of profits. Accordingly, managers behave as if 
shareholders were risk neutral. Shareholders of family firms, instead, generally have a large share of 
their wealth concentrated in the company. With incomplete insurance markets, their ability to 
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diversify risk is limited. They will therefore try to reduce the exposure to risk of the firm they own. 
Formally, they or their managers will maximize the expected utility of the firm’s profits rather than 
the expected value of such profits. 
 
The attitude to risk has a substantial bearing on the export and FDI decision of firms. In what 
follows we focus on exports. Though it might be a way of edging local demand shocks, entering  
the export market is a risky choice: it involves sunk costs, potentially higher volatility of revenues, 
limited knowledge of a new market, tougher competition etc.  Thus, whereas in widely held 
companies decision of entry is essentially related to expected cost and revenue factors, in family 
firms it is also affected by the level of risk aversion of the shareholders.  
 
Family firms differ of course from public corporations under many other aspects that might also 
influence the export decision. It is often argued that they are relatively less efficient than other 
firms, for example because of the dynastic choice of management, and therefore cannot recover the 
sunk cost of entering the new export market1. Also, family firms are typically reluctant to partly 
decentralise governance in order to manage complex operations spread in several countries.  We 
will also take these other factors into account in our analysis.  
 
We develop a simple illustrative model of the decision of exporting. This choice is governed by the 
cost of entering new markets, the risk attendant to such decision and the owner’s risk aversion. We 
assume that firms have the option of selling their goods in three different markets: home, a close 
foreign market (Europe) and a far away market (the rest of the world).  Under different 
configurations on sunk costs and volatility of revenues across markets we show that the export 
decision is a function of both the sunk costs of exporting and the firm’s risk aversion. 
 
The predictions of our model are then tested for a panel of Italian firms. Italy provides an ideal 
testing ground for our model. The country has been steadily losing competitiveness in world 
markets2 and has only recently been able to regain market shares. The specialisation of Italian firms 
in traditional sectors, their average small size and the wide diffusion of family ownership are often 
seen as major constraints to strengthening competitiveness and gaining market shares.  
 
                                                 
1
 Although evidence on this is not uncontroversial. For example, Favero et al, 2006 find  in a subsample of listed 
companies that Italian family firms are more productive than the others. 
2
 The share of Italian products in world trade in constant prices fell from 4.5% in 1995 to 3% in 2003, the years covered 
by our micro-data. 
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Our main results can be summarized as follows. We find that, controlling for several firm specific 
factors, family firms export less than others, both in Europe and in the rest of the World. On 
average these firms sell about 3 percent more output in the domestic market, 10 percent less in the 
European market and 12 percent less in non European countries than non family firms. This effect 
holds, even when we control for those standard factors which per se are supposed to hamper the 
efficient working of family firms and consequently the choice of exporting, like the structure of 
management and credit constraints. It also holds when we control for the direct effect of 
productivity. Although risk aversion cannot be directly observed and measured, it provides a 
plausible explanation of this gap. 
 
It is however important to notice that we find non linearities in the way productivity and size relate 
to the export gap. The negative effect of being a family firm on exports is smaller for large and 
highly efficient firms3.  In our framework of analysis this means that risk aversion is a greater 
obstacle to exporting for small and least productive firms, but its effect tends to fade away with size 
and efficiency. This is a realistic outcome. The “all eggs in one basket” argument certainly bites 
more when firms are small than for large, often diversified and listed conglomerates, albeit 
controlled by one family.   
    
In what follows we briefly review the literature on family firms and performance. We then develop 
our theoretical model. The following section describes the data we use and our empirical 
specifications. In section 4 we report our empirical findings and finally we conclude and derive the 
main policy implications. 
 
2. Family firms and the decision to export: analytical background 
 
Why should the structure of ownership of firms affect their decision to carry out activities in foreign 
markets and their international performance? There are very few contributions looking at the 
exporting decision, but from the broader literature we may identify three reasons why family firms 
might behave differently from other firms: performance, agency problems and risk preferences.  
 
As for performance, the positive association between efficiency and the international activities of 
the firms, being those exports or foreign direct investment, is a well established fact. Most of the 
theoretical and empirical literature reconciles this association with the need to overcome the fixed 
                                                 
3
 The effect of family firms on exporting becomes non significant at the 90th percentile of the size distribution and at the 
the 95th percentile of the productivity distribution.  
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cost of entering foreign markets. If family firms are on average less efficient, their ex-ante chances 
of having international operations are lower than for public companies.  
 
Indeed, several studies have shown that, other things equal, family firms are less efficient than 
public companies. These findings go far back to the historical evidence on British firms provided by 
David Landes, (1965) to more recent analyses like, for example, the study of  Perez Gonzales 2006 
on US publicly traded corporations or Bloom and Van Reenen, 2006 on  management practices in 
US, UK, France and Germany.  On a broader scale, a cross country analysis of the relationship 
between family values and economic performance shows that ‘countries where family is regarded 
as more important have lower levels of per capita GDP, smaller firms, a higher fraction of self-
employment, fewer publicly traded firms on average, and rely less on external financing’ (Bertrand 
and Schoar, 2007) . The only exception to this consensus is a recent study on France (Sraer and 
Thesmar, 2006), that finds that family owned firms, first or further generation, perform better than 
widely held companies and a study on a sample of 150 Italian listed companies by Favero et al 
(2006). 
 
One reason why family firms perform relatively badly is that the dynastic transmission of the 
management responsibility over the firm reduces the pool of talents among which managers are 
selected (Caselli and Gennaioli, 2003, Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer, 2003, Bennedsen et al 2006). 
Family firms may also be constrained by the lack of external funds and the owner’s reluctance to 
open up management to qualified outsiders.  
 
A second line of argument, but leading to opposite conclusions, concerns agency issues. The 
organizational strength of the family firm is indeed its ability to overcome agency problems in 
management decisions. Family bonds reduce the incentive to shirk for members of the family. 
Therefore, centralised management can in principle be more efficient when firms deal with complex 
and highly risky markets (Berle and Means, 1932). From this perspective family firms could in 
principle be expected to be better fit than other type of firms for the international market, given that 
these are highly volatile and less known to the firm than the domestic one.  
 
These two arguments are however not fully convincing. As for the first one Marin and Verdier 
(2006) and Acemoglu et al (2007) argue that what really matters for performance, and consequently 
the decision to go abroad, is not much the type of ownership of the firm but, rather, the degree of 
decentralisation of decision making. This conclusion is also supported by evidence on a sample of 
US firms (Zahara, 2005). Family firms could likely overcome the problem of dynastic management 
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by hiring professional managers, as it is indeed the case in most large family companies.  Therefore, 
even if on average we might expect family firms to be less productive, there will be a large variance 
in performance, as these firms move to more sophisticated and decentralised systems of 
management. Thus, when we relate ownership to export performance we must make sure we also 
control for the role external managers play within the firm. The same type of reasoning should also 
apply to the second argument and somehow revert its logic. When firms expand into foreign 
markets, family members are forced to delegate part of their power to independent managers. In 
other words, agency problems would emerge anyway, as centralised decision making procedures 
necessarily get diluted to successfully operate in foreign markets. If this is the case, then, the agency 
argument backfires. Shareholders could be against expanding into foreign markets, precisely 
because they do not want to decentralise decision making. 
  
A third line of argument explaining a possible reluctance to expand abroad, the one we follow in 
this paper, is related to risk aversion.  In the presence of incomplete markets for risk diversification, 
we might expect that decision making in a family firm is characterised by greater risk aversion than 
in a public company. Indeed, public companies should aim at maximizing expected profits, as 
shareholders can diversify their risk through their portfolio of assets.  Shareholders of family firms 
are likely to have a large chunk of their wealth in the firm, in other words they are less able to 
diversify their risk through asset allocation. With imperfect insurance markets, risk adverse 
shareholders will tend to maximise their expected utility rather than the expected level of profits. 
The fact that family firms are often less leveraged than widely held corporation is taken by several 
contributions as an indirect evidence of the higher risk aversion of their shareholders (Agrawal and 
Nagarajan, 1990, Schulze and Dino, 1998, Zellweger, 2006, Gallo, Tapies and Cappuyns, 2000, 
Mishra and Mc Conaughy, 1999).  
 
The reasons why risk aversion might discourage entry into foreign markets are three. The first one 
is that these markets can be more volatile than the domestic one. The counterfactual is of course that 
by selling their products in several markets firms mange to hedge market specific volatility. Yet, we 
will show in the next section that the variability of profits per employee is higher for exporting than 
for non exporting firms in our sample. The second one is that firms have a relatively imperfect 
knowledge of other countries and their economies. Finally, if exporting involves initial sunk costs, 
which are relatively large with respect to the size of the firm and financial markets are imperfect, 
then the risk of bankruptcy might be larger for exporters, other things equal.  All these reasons are 
strengthened the more complex are international activities in terms of export intensity, the number 
and the distance of the markets served, the range of foreign operations (trade and FDI). 
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 If these assumptions are correct, then risk adverse shareholders of family firms might be reluctant 
to undertake this step, independently of their ex-ante efficiency and the structure of management 
within the firm. Risk aversion might induce family firms to avoid entering foreign markets, even if 
they are highly profitable and they have already a fairly decentralised management structure. 
 
In the next section we take this presumption to the data and show some stylised facts that are in line 
with the idea that family firms are more reluctant to enter export markets because of risk aversion.  
 
3. Basic facts and motivations 
 
We need three pieces of information to support our argument. First we must show that the 
behaviour of family firms is indeed consistent with the hypothesis of risk aversion. Second, we need 
to check if family firms export less than non family firms. Also, as the decision to export involves 
several potential markets, we need to see if the export behaviour of these firms is affected by the 
characteristics of the potential market, for example its remoteness. Third, we must examine if 
exporting does indeed involve more risk than operating in the domestic market.  Before addressing 
these issues, though we must briefly describe the data set we use.  
 
3.1 Data and descriptive statistics 
 
The data used in this paper come from the last three waves (1998, 2001 and 2004) of a survey on 
activities of a representative sample of Italian manufacturing firms carried out by Capitalia 
(Osservatorio sulle Piccole e Medie Imprese).  
The detailed questionnaire collects qualitative and quantitative information on ownership, trade, 
labour force and innovation on the previous three years. Such information is complemented with 
standard balance sheet data obtained from Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk).  
All firms with more than 500 employees are included in each wave while most of the firms with 
less than 500 employees are selected with a stratified sampling method each time with a rotating 
panel scheme, therefore only few of them appear in two consecutive waves. After the cleaning 
procedures on missing and extreme values we obtain an unbalanced panel of 7393 firms covering 
the years from 1995 to 2003. Detailed description of sample selection and the dataset used in the 
paper can be found in Appendix A2. 
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From the detailed information on the firm’s structure of labour force and ownership, we define 
family firms as those where either the founder or one of his family members is part of management. 
The only other restriction we impose is that the firm has a share of private ownership greater than 
zero4   
 
This definition is relatively loose, as firms could be fully run by independent managers. 
Accordingly, several amongst Italy’s largest groups would not be classified as family firms in our 
analysis. Yet this definition has two advantages. The first one is that it is probably fully exogenous 
from the exporting status of the firm. In other words firm that start exporting might need to hire 
independent managers, or dilute control, but not necessarily to change ownership status and expel or 
family members from management.  The second one, that the presence of family member in 
management is an indirect, albeit imperfect indicator of the influence of the family over the running 
of the company. Moreover, notice that our sample combines non-listed and listed firms, which is a 
step forward with respect to previous empirical studies of family firms, which are based on 
evidence for listed firms5. 
 
Restricting our family firms to those with a non negative share of private ownership,  might fail to 
capture family firms organised as holdings. In our sample there are indeed 574 firms that are 
managed by the founder and/or the family but have no private ownership. In  Appendix A3 we carry 
out a robustness check and we show that our results hold when we include also this group of firms. 
 
Table 1 reports the distribution of firms according to their ownership status and their size. Almost 
80 percent of the firms in our sample can be classified as family firms, on the basis of our 
definition. As expected, the distribution of family ownership by firm size is skewed towards smaller 
firms. However family firms are not necessarily small. Indeed, more than 26 percent of the firms 
with more than 500 employees are family owned. Furthermore we show in the appendix that there 
is not an identifiable sectoral pattern in the distribution of family firms (Table A1.1). 
 
                                                 
4
 Private ownership refers to Italian individuals or Italian manufacturing firms. 
5
 Perez-Gonzalez, 2006, Saer and Thesmar 2006 and Favero et al. (2006). 
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   Table 1 Share of family firms by size classes 
 
 
Share  of family firms 
(%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall (100%) 79.41  
Size classes by number of 
employees   
(share of size class) 
 
Less than 20 (27.30%) 89.13  
Between 21 and 50  (33.42%) 87.90  
Between  51 and 250 (30.24%) 72.72  
Between  251 and 499 (4.82%) 45.56  
More than 500 (4.22%) 26.31  
 
 
 
 Basic facts 
 
Are family firms risk averse?  Risk aversion cannot be observed directly, but we can compare the 
propensity of taking risky decisions of family and other firms. Several contributions have argued 
that an outcome of risk aversion is a less leveraged financial structure6. In table 2 we report a 
measure of leverage for the two groups of companies. This measure is given by the ratio of financial 
debts to total assets7.  Family firms are moderately, on average, less leveraged than other firms. Of 
course this is a very crude indicator of risk aversion, in that the degree of leverage reflects both the 
preferences of the firms and of the bankers. Firms could be less leveraged because they have a 
lower ability to repay, because they are smaller and credit constrained (Guiso, 2004 shows that 
small Italian firms in Italy have less access to credit than larger ones). In table 2, indeed, we show 
that on average family firms in our sample are marginally less efficient8 and smaller than other 
firms. Also, a larger share among them face credit constraints9 and a smaller share use alternative 
sources of funding like risk capital.  To control for higher moments of the distribution, we also 
show in figure 1 the distribution of the two groups of firms on the basis of their productivity. We 
find non family firms are weakly dominating family ones in terms of productivity distribution10.   
 
                                                 
6
 See Guiso and Parigi (1999), Caselli, Pagano and Schivardi. (2003) and Collins(1997) among others. 
7
 Financial debts are calculated as the sum of  short and long term financial liabilities and bonds; Total assets= total 
liabilities and net asset (liabilities and shareholders funds)  
8
 In Table 2, the logarithm of TFP is very close between family and non family firms. The TFP index – defined as the 
relative productivity of each firm with respect to the sector, year average– is smaller on average for family firms, 
though its standard deviation is lower.  
9
 We define a firm as considered credit constrained if in the questionnaire it declares it were willing to pay a higher 
interest rate to obtain more credit. 
10
 With a two sided stochastic dominance test we reject with 1 percent confidence level the hypotheses that the two 
distributions are equal and that the “family” one dominates the non family one. However we can accept with only 8 
percent confidence level (P=0.08) that the family firms’ productivity distribution is stochastically dominated by the 
non-family firms’ one. 
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To understand if family firms are less leveraged, even taking into account the other characteristics 
that might impinge on their financial structure, we regress the leverage index on a dummy capturing 
the firm ownership status (family or not) and controls such as size, productivity, industry and time 
dummies. Furthermore we also include the credit constraint dummy as a control to check if the 
smaller leverage is entirely explained by the access to credit. Columns (3) and (6) in table A1.2 
show that this is not the case. There is of course strong endogneity in all of these relationship; these 
regressions should be taken as purely descriptive. The results, reported in appendix A1, confirm that 
the lower leverage of family firms is robust to the inclusion of such controls. .  
 
Table 2. Characteristics by ownership 
 
 
  
Family 
  
Non Family 
 
   Obs Mean Std. Dev.  Obs Mean Std. Dev.  
           
 Leverage  24611 0.203 0.197  6461 0.232 0.189  
 Employment  26940 68.332 194.569  6989 305.489 759.917  
 LnTFP  24849 1.367 0.869  6602 1.073 0.530  
 TFP_indexa  24849 0.883 0.438  6602 1.111 0.684  
 Share of Listed firms  26801 0.006 0.080  6911 0.034 0.182  
 Share of firms that are credit constrained  26512 0.050 0.217  6491 0.037 0.188  
 
 
         
Notes:  
The difference in the means is statistically different from zero at 1% confidence level for all the variables 
a
 TFP index where productivity is normalized with respect to sector, year and class size averages. 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Productivity by “Family” 
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Do family firms export less? The second piece of information we need to establish is whether family 
firms do indeed export less than others. We need to qualify what we mean by ‘exporting’. This 
normally refers to the export status of the firm, whether it exports or not. Actually this choice has 
several other dimensions. The first one is how much a firm does export, what share of its total 
output foreign sales account for. The second one is to which market products are sold. Are these 
neighbouring markets like the EU or more distant markets like Asia or the US? The final one is how 
many foreign countries products are sold to. Is it just one or more than one? If more than one, are 
these close to each other or far away? All these dimensions of foreign activities are important as 
they imply varying fixed costs and risk exposures. Entering each market involves a duplication of 
fixed costs and the exposure to new specific, possibly risky, market conditions. Selling in far away 
markets could likely be more costly and risky than following well beaten tracks in relative nearby 
locations.  
 
According to our data, family firms do export a lower share of their sales than non family ones, 
25,3% vs. 33,1%. In table 3 we look at market destinations. We report, for each group of firms, the 
share of those that only sell at home, only export to the EU, only to the Rest of the World and to 
both markets. We find that among family firms the share either not exporting or exporting just to 
one area (EU or RoW) is larger. In contrast the share of firms selling to both export areas is 
considerably lower. Of course this is again purely descriptive at this stage. We will show in section 
6 how these results hold when tested under rigororus econometric analysis.  
 
Table 3. Share of firms that sell to each “destination” by family (%) 
 
 
 
 
Family 
  
Non Family 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Only Home  34.27  23.77  
 Only EU (and Home)  16.06  13.96  
 Only OTHER (and Home)  5.05  4.70  
 All destinations  44.63  57.57  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Tot.  100.00  100.00  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
If selling to both areas involves larger fixed costs and facing more uncertain market conditions this 
pattern could be reconducted to risk aversion. However this is true only if foreign markets are 
riskier than domestic ones.  
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Are foreign markets riskier than domestic ones? To assess whether foreign markets are risky, we 
compute for each firm a measure of the time variability of profits per employee11. If foreign markets 
are more volatile, hence riskier, we expect this index to rise with the foreign activities of the firm. 
Note that this might not be the case. If market volatility in different areas of the world (home and 
foreign or between foreign markets) is uncorrelated, exporting could actually be a way of hedging 
risks.  
 
We therefore regress this index on several measures of the exporting activity of the firm and 
controls like size, industry and time dummies. We find that exports are positively related to the 
volatility of profits and that selling in different markets does not seem to be a risk hedging strategy.  
In column 1 of table 4 we compare exporting and non exporting firms, whereby EXP is a dummy 
which is equal 1 if firms do export. We find that profits are more volatile for firms that export. Yet, 
being an exporter in itself does not mean much. Here we classify as exporters also firms that do sell 
abroad 1% of their output. What matters for volatility is how important exports are with respect to 
the total activities of the firm. In column 2 we therefore look at the share of exports on total sales, 
and find that volatility keeps increasing with export intensity.  
 
It is also important to consider the destination of exports. Far away markets could be riskier than 
closer ones: firms might have a more limited knowledge of such countries. But these markets could 
also provide better risk hedging, as trends in demand are less likely to be correlated to those at 
home. In our sample we can observe whether firms export to the EU or to the rest of the world 
(RoW). In column 3 we relate the volatility index to a dummy that captures four potential statuses 
of the firm: if it does not exports, our excluded dummy, if it exports to the EU, to the RoW or to 
both areas. We find that volatility is significantly higher for firms exporting to both areas. It is also 
higher (although not significantly) for firms exporting in either areas, but less so for exporters to the 
Rest of the World. We can therefore conclude that a diversified exporting strategy is indeed 
associated to higher risks. Firms operating in several markets are exposed to more uncertain 
outcomes, probably because they have a limited knowledge of individual countries, or because the 
likelihood of facing downward trends in local markets increases. Risks rise also when firms operate 
just in one export area, although “RoW” provides some better hedging than the nearby EU market.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 More precisely this measure is given by the standard deviation between t and (t-3) of the profits per employee 
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Table 4  Premium regressions: Variability of profit per employee 
   
Dependent Variables 
  
σ(pi/empl) σ (pi/empl) σ (pi/empl) 
σ (pi/empl)  
before and after 
exporting 
 (starters)a 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
    
Exporter Dummy 10.641   -1.537 
  
[4.198]**   [2.217] 
Export Share  0.172   
  
 [0.067]***   
Exporter to EU & RoW (Dummy)   12.482  
  
  [4.576]***  
Exporter to EU only (Dummy)   6.778  
  
  [4.953]  
Exporter to RoW  only (Dummy)   6.408  
  
  [7.073]  
Constant -3.291 -3.923 -26.127 -5.744 
  
[3.944] [3.889] [16.592] [2.717]** 
 
    
Observations 27692 27659 27206 1058 
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.17 
Notes: σ (pi/empl) has been calculated between t and (t-3) 
           All estimations include two-digit industry dummies, size controls and time dummies. 
a
 the sample has been restricted to those firms that we can follow for more than one wave and we can see 
changing their export status 
           Robust standard errors in brackets. 
          *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
 
Summing up exporting does indeed appear to be associated with higher volatility. It also seems that 
risks rise with the intensity and geographic diversification of foreign activities.  
 
The stylised facts reported in this section are helpful in defining a set of working hypothesis for the 
construction of a simple theoretical model of the decision to export for risk adverse firms. 
 
4. The model 
 
Consider a simple model where a firm can either sell in its own domestic market (D) only or export 
to possibly two foreign markets (EU and ROW) as well.  
 
If the firm caters only to the domestic market, its net revenue is: 
 
ε+= DD yR   
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where ε is N(0,1). If the firm also sells to a foreign market, its additional revenue is:  
 
iiiii fyR ησ+−=   
 
where i= EU, ROW, ηi is N(0,1), σi > 1, and fi  is the fixed cost of exporting to country i. We 
assume that both ηeu  and  ηrow are correlated with  ε, with correlation coefficients ρeu  and  ρrow 
respectively12. Note that yD and yi – fi are independently determined. The implicit (and strong) 
assumption in this set up is that either constant returns to scale prevail both at home and abroad 
(except for the fixed cost component) or that markets are segmented, so that the non stochastic 
component of revenues (yD and yi – fi) are uncorrelated.  
 
Finally, we assume that that firms’ owners are not able to fully diversify their assets. Accordingly, 
they will maximize the expected value of the utility of the firm’s profits rather than, as in the 
standard set up with complete diversification, the expected value of profits. For tractability, we 
assume that the owner’s utility is of the CARA type. The optimization problem becomes: 
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where the second equality derives from the assumption that the error term is normally distributed. 
Risk aversion is measured by parameter a.  
 
We need to determine the value of R. If the firm sells only in the domestic market, then R=RD, with 
mean yD and variance equal to one.  If in addition the firm sells also to market i, then total revenue 
is distributed normally with mean yD + yi and variance 1 + σ2i + 2 σi ρi. Accordingly, the firms will 
export to market i if the following condition holds:  
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12
 For analytical simplicity, we assume that the correlation between the stochastic shock in the foreign markets is nil. 
Our results are basically unchanged if we relax this assumption.  
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i.e. if: 
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We first consider the case where feu < frow and  (σeu2/2) + σeu ρeu ≤ (σrow2/2) + σrow  ρrow, namely 
when the EU market is less costly and less risky than the rest of the world.  
The possible equilibria can be represented by a simple graph:  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Equilibria 
 
 
 
 
where EU (ROW) = 0 indicates that there is no export activity to the EU (ROW). Consider the area 
where the firm exports to both markets. Suppose that risk aversion, i.e. the parameter a, increases. 
We then move from left to right. We see that for a critical threshold of the risk aversion parameter, 
the firm will stop exporting to ROW (the riskier market) and for an even higher level of a, will stop 
exporting altogether.  
 
We can also assess the impact of higher productivity. Suppose that initially the firm does not export 
to either markets (i.e. EU=ROW=0). If now yi increases, the firm will first start exporting to the EU  
yi 
feu 
frow 
EU=0 ROW=0 
EU>0 
ROW=0 
EU>0 ROW>0 
a 
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and then when yi is high enough will also export to the rest of the world. More crucially, we see that 
the impact of higher productivity on the export decision will depend on the level of risk aversion. 
With higher risk aversions, even relatively productive firm will not export.  
 
Consider now the case where feu < frow and (σeu2/2) + σeu ρeu > (σrow2/2) + σrow  ρrow, namely when 
the EU market is less costly but riskier than the rest of the world. This may happen for instance if 
far away markets are less, or even negatively correlated, with home shocks.  Graphically: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Equilibria (market diversification) 
 
 
Most of the previous analysis carries through. The interesting twist here is that firms may not need 
to export to the EU before exporting to the rest of the world. Relatively risk averse firms may prefer 
exporting to far away markets first simply as a way to diversify their risk.  
 
 
5. Empirical Implementation  
 
In addition to the descriptive evidence shown in section 2, tables A.1.3 and A.1.4 in Appendix A1 
report more summary statistics for the main variables of interest in this paper, and essentially 
compare firms across the two main characteristics we would like to study: their exporting status and 
their ownership status. As for the exporting status more than 60 percent of the firms in our sample 
a 
yi 
feu 
frow 
EU=0 ROW=0 
EU>0 
ROW=0 
EU>0 ROW>0 
EU=0 
ROW>0 
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are exporters. Moreover, exporting firms typically sell both in the EU and in the Rest of the World. 
The share of firms exporting only to the EU is relatively small, 15,6%; that of firms exporting only 
to the Rest of the World is even smaller (4.9%). Interestingly enough, the domestic market is a key 
outlet, even for exporting firms.  
 
A clear and expected pattern is that firms exporting in both markets are the largest and the most 
productive. Also, the role of independent managers and the skill intensity of the personnel seem to 
be increasing with the complexity of international activities.  
Of course not much can be said from these purely descriptive patterns and we now move on to the 
econometric analysis.  
 
5.2 Empirical Specifications 
 
Our empirical strategy is understanding the relationship between the ownership status of the firm 
and its export performance. Remember that our presumption is that family firms are more reluctant 
to export, particularly to distant markets because of risk aversion. This can only be tested indirectly, 
as risk aversion cannot be measured. We will therefore estimate the link between ownership status 
and export, controlling for all the other observable factors that might also affect this relationship 
(productivity, management, credit constraints etc.). 
 
The empirical specification is inspired by the model developed in section 4. We use a probabilistic 
framework to model the decision to export to a specific destination. A firm decides to sell its 
product abroad when the current value of expected utility from profits from exporting exceeds the 
fixed costs associated with international trade.  
 
This can be expressed with a discrete-choice equation: 
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otherwise      0
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  (1)      
 
where Yitj is the variable indicating sales of firm i at time t in market j (EU, Rest of the World, 
Home). [ ])(E YitjU pi  is a function of expected profits and the attitude towards risks at the firm level 
and ijS  are fixed costs for firm i of exporting to j. We then assume that expected profits are a 
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function of firm characteristics Xit while the attitude toward risk depends on the firm’s ownership 
structure. After adding an error term, the choice equation becomes:  
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According to the literature on the determinants of firms’ export decision (Bernard and 
Jensen, 2004), the vector Xit of firm’s characteristics includes employment, productivity, the age of 
the firm and technological proxies as skill intensity and R&D. Rit includes characteristics such as 
ownership structure that can capture risk aversion. Dj are destination dummies.  ρi are time invariant 
firm’s characteristics such as industry13 and δt is a time effect. 
 
Taking as dependent variable the value of sales to each destination we estimate Poisson regressions. 
We rely on a constant elasticity framework, where the conditional expectation of Yitj can be 
expressed as E(exp(xitβ)). We can then derive the following equation to be estimated via Poisson 
pseudo maximum likelihood estimator  
 
)exp(),,|0Pr( tijitYYitYjitYititj DRXDRXY δργλ ++++=≥  
 
 The Poisson estimator is adequate to take into account the zero-values of the dependent 
variable. In addition it has the desirable robustness property that consistency of estimates will be 
achieved as long as the conditional mean is correctly specified without requiring any additional 
assumptions on the distribution of Yitj given Xit (Wooldridge, 2002 and Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 
2006). Therefore the data do not have to follow a Poisson distribution neither Yitj needs to be an 
integer for the estimations to be consistent (Gourieroux, Monfort and Trognong, 1984). Standard 
errors will be affected by deviations from the Poisson assumption: to cope with this issue we 
compute variance-covariance matrices robust to overdispersion and heteroskedasticity. 
 
The framework presented in section 4 is focused on the discrete choice of exporting to a specific 
destination. Therefore, to distinguish between the choice of exporting and the quantities exported 
we also check for selection into export with an Heckman selection model. 
 
 
                                                 
13
 As a robustness checks we also estimate a specification with firm fixed effects. 
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6. Results 
 
The first column of Table 5 shows the estimates of our benchmark equation on the value of sales by 
destination; where we do not include any proxy for risk aversion, i.e. vector Rit. As expected, we 
find that firms tend to sell, on average, a larger values at home than abroad, as indicated by the 
negative sign of both the EU14 dummy and the Rest of the World dummy that represent the 
destination fixed effects15. Productivity is a key factor affecting the decision concerning the market 
of destination of output. A measure of total factor productivity is included in the estimations, by 
itself and interacted with the EU and the ROW dummies. We find that more productive firms tend 
to sell relatively more in the EU than at home and shipping an even greater share of their output to 
far away destinations in the Rest of the World. In all the estimates we control also for size and firm 
characteristics such as age, skill share, employment in R&D and share of foreign ownership. 
Different specifications of this benchmark equation are reported in appendix A1.  
 
In column 2, we expand the benchmark equation to assess the impact of corporate ownership to see  
whether family firms behave differently. We therefore add to the baseline specification a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 for family firms (and zero otherwise) and interact it with the 
destination dummies. Note that our indicator of family firms is likely exogenous to the choice of the 
output market. We find that family firms, even after controlling for productivity and size16 tend to 
sell more in the domestic market, export less to the EU and even less to the Rest of the World17.  In 
other words, and this is our key results, the ownership status has a significant effect on the decision 
to export and specifically family firms are less likely to enter foreign markets, even less so for 
distant ones. Note that this effect holds independently on the standard effects of size and 
productivity on the exporting decision. In other words even though family firms might be less 
productive than non family ones, this and size are not sufficient motives to justify their relatively 
weaker export performance.  
 
We also control for the interacted effect of the ownership status and productivity. Do our findings 
on the effect of ownership on the export decision change according to the level of productivity of 
the firm? We find that the negative family effect tends to be weaker the higher is productivity. The 
same result holds if we interact ownership status and size (Column 5). This tells us that the 
ownership constraint to exporting is partly overcome in more productive and larger firms.   
                                                 
14
 EU is considered in its EU15 meaning and it includes: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK, Spain, Sweden 
15
 Where the base category is the home market 
16
 In columns 1 3 and 4 we also include size dummies but we do not report the coefficients. 
17
 According to the Pseudo R2, by adding this variable we also improve the fit of the model. 
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Table 5. Family and Trade 
 
 
Dep Var: Value of sales to j (EU, RoW, Home) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
     
EU dummy -0.553 -1.331 -0.471 -0.633 -1.156 
 
[0.004]*** [0.014]*** [0.009]*** [0.011]*** [0.031]*** 
RoW Dummy -0.761 -1.674 -0.638 -0.889 -1.425 
 
[0.006]*** [0.017]*** [0.011]*** [0.013]*** [0.036]*** 
Family   0.059 0.029 0.061 
 
  [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.010]*** 
Family*EU   -0.100 -0.110 -0.287 
 
  [0.010]*** [0.020]*** [0.036]*** 
Family*RoW   -0.152 -0.129 -0.368 
 
  [0.013]*** [0.024]*** [0.042]*** 
Lntfp -0.048  -0.042 -0.007  
 
[0.003]***  [0.003]*** [0.004]*  
Lntfp*EU 0.246  0.235 0.142  
 
[0.010]***  [0.010]*** [0.015]***  
Lntfp*RoW 0.290  0.273 0.153  
 
[0.012]***  [0.012]*** [0.018]***  
Lntfp*family    -0.002  
 
   [0.004]  
Lntfp*family *EU    0.058  
 
   [0.015]***  
Lntfp*family *RoW    0.050  
 
   [0.018]***  
Lnempl  0.013   0.023 
 
 [0.001]***   [0.002]*** 
Lnempl*EU  0.200   0.156 
 
 [0.003]***   [0.006]*** 
Lnempl*RoW  0.233   0.178 
 
 [0.004]***   [0.007]*** 
Lnempl*family     -0.015 
 
    [0.002]*** 
Lnempl*family *EU     0.075 
 
    [0.007]*** 
Lnempl*family *RoW     0.086 
 
    [0.008]*** 
Constant 2.246 2.262 2.297 2.395 1.929 
 
[0.149]*** [0.112]*** [0.150]*** [0.145]*** [0.139]*** 
 
     
Observations 90184 97585 90184 90184 97148 
Pseudo Rsq 0.1648 0.1749 0.1694 0.1798 0.1760 
Notes: 
Coefficients for the regressors as estimated by Poisson maximum likelihood estimator; All estimations include controls (not reported) 
for Age of the firm, workers’ skill ratio, employment in R&D, Share of foreign ownership (also interacted with destination dummies) 
in addition to size dummies (except for columns 2 and 5) two-digit industry dummies and time dummies.   Robust standard errors in 
brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, 
 
The Poisson estimates in Table 5 do control for “zeros” but do not properly differentiate between 
domestic and foreign markets. Therefore, to account for the selection into export market we also 
estimate an Heckman selection model with maximum likelihood and we report the results in table 6. 
To identify the selection equation we use the credit constraint dummy since we consider this as 
proxy of the fixed costs incurred by firms in entering markets. We exclude this variable from the 
second step given that once the fixed costs are paid firms decide on their sales on the basis of other 
characteristics. We choose to control only for selection in export markets and not selection into each 
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market (column 1b and 2b ) since we want to exclude the domestic sales. Column 1a confirms the 
results of our benchmark equation and column 2a the results on the family variable. 
 
Table 6 . Heckman selection model 
  
Dep. Var. Value of sales to 
j 
Export dummy Value of sales to 
j 
Export dummy 
 
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
 
    
EU dummy -2.416  -2.323  
 
[0.033]***  [0.074]***  
RoW Dummy -4.813  -4.352  
 
[0.044]***  [0.100]***  
Lntfp 0.158 0.153 0.178 0.154 
 
[0.036]*** [0.010]*** [0.036]*** [0.010]*** 
Lntfp*EU 0.569  0.558  
 
[0.071]***  [0.072]***  
Lntfp*RoW 0.723  0.669  
 
[0.093]***  [0.093]***  
Family   0.156 0.083 
 
  [0.039]*** [0.015]*** 
Family*EU   -0.114  
 
  [0.081]  
Family*RoW   -0.562  
 
  [0.110]***  
Credit constraint  -0.028  -0.030 
 
 [0.022]  [0.022] 
Cr. constr.*EU     
 
    
Cr. constr.*RoW     
 
    
Constant 10.790 -1.991 10.710 -2.650 
 
[1.082]*** [0.209]*** [1.082]*** [0.186]*** 
 
    
Observations 88726 88726 88726 88726 
Lambda -0.065  [0.046] -0.077   [0.048]* 
Notes: 
j=EU, RoW, Home; All estimations include controls (not reported) for Age of the firm, workers’ skill ratio, employment in R&D, 
Share of foreign ownership (also interacted with destination dummies) in addition to size dummies,  two-digit industry dummies and 
time dummies; Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
To conclude, as a robustness check, in Table 7, we show how these results are robust to controlling 
for unobserved firm heterogeneity using a fixed effect Poisson estimator18. These estimates should 
be seen with considerable caution. In a fixed effect framework, the coefficients are identified 
through firm level within variation. However, the structure of our panel means that larger firms are 
more likely to appear in two consecutive waves. Hence, in this latter case, our coefficients are more 
likely to capture the behaviour of large firms rather than small and medium sized ones. 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Poisson allows estimation of results with firm fixed effects since (unlike Heckman selection model) it is not 
susceptible to incidental parameter problems (Wooldridge, 2002).  Robust standard errors are obtained using the 
“xtpqml” stata module that implements the correction described in Wooldridge (1999). 
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Table 7. Fixed Effects  
 
 
Dep Var: Value of sales to j (EU, RoW, Home) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 .   
EU dummy -0.469 -0.466 -0.461 
 
[0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.018]*** 
RoW Dummy -0.636 -0.633 -0.628 
 
[0.021]*** [0.022]*** [0.022]*** 
Family 0.051 0.047 0.105 
 
[0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.020]*** 
Family*EU -0.102 -0.104 -0.190 
 
[0.019]*** [0.019]*** [0.033]*** 
Family*RoW -0.155 -0.158 -0.236 
 
[0.023]*** [0.023]*** [0.040]*** 
Lntfp -0.108 -0.109 -0.080 
 
[0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.011]*** 
Lntfp*EU 0.229 0.233 0.178 
 
[0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.023]*** 
Lntfp*RoW 0.267 0.272 0.219 
 
[0.020]*** [0.021]*** [0.027]*** 
Credit constraint  0.036  
 
 [0.023]  
Credit constraint*EU  -0.037  
 
 [0.040]  
Credit constraint*RoW  -0.015  
  [0.050]  
Lntfp*family   -0.055 
 
  [0.014]*** 
Lntfp*family *EU   0.086 
 
  [0.023]*** 
Lntfp*family *RoW   0.081 
 
  [0.029]*** 
 
   
Observations 90183 88755 90183 
Number of firms 7594 7528 7594 
Log likelihood -310547.54 -304783.06 -310499.2 
Notes: 
All estimations include controls (not reported) for Age of the firm, workers’ skill ratio, employment in R&D, Share of foreign ownership (also 
interacted with destination dummies) in addition to size dummies two-digit industry dummies and time dummies.   
Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, 
 
 
 
Finally in Appendix 1 (Table A1.5) we report further robustness checks. We include in these 
regressions other observable factors that might affect the propensity of family firms to exports and 
that might therefore be captured by the family dummy in the estimations reported above. These are 
whether firms are listed (and indirect sign of access to capital and sophistication of the financial 
structure), credit constraint and the presence of independent managers.  
 
We are aware that particularly the share of independent managers  suffers from severe endogeneity 
problems. Still, it is necessary to check whether our results survive to the addition of such covariate. 
Findings are reassuring. The base results on the impact of the family dummy, size and productivity 
are all unchanged. Second, as expected, we find that firms with a higher share of outside managers 
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tend to export more, particularly to far away destinations, though the direction of causality for this 
variable remains ambiguous.   
 
Summing up, even controlling for all those factors that might explain why family firms are less 
export oriented, our regressions preserve a significant effect of the family dummy. This tells us that 
family firms are less export oriented than other firms for other reasons than efficiency, size, the 
presence of independent managers or credit constraints. Even though we cannot capture it directly, 
we attribute this remaining unobserved effect to risk aversion. 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
 
This paper examines whether the export decision of firms is somehow affected by their ownership 
structure. The key argument is that family firms are likely to be more risk averse than widely owned 
firms. This is an all eggs in one basket argument:  in the case of family firms most assets of the 
owners will likely be concentrated in the firm. In contrast, shareholders of widely held firms can 
diversify their assets through the market. Consequently, in the absence of complete insurance 
markets, the objective of family firms is to maximize the expected utility of their risk averse 
shareholders, and the objective of widely held firms is the maximisation of the profits of their 
(behaving like) risk neutral shareholders.  
 
Risk aversion may be an obstacle to enter foreign markets, as far as these are perceived as more 
volatile and risky than the domestic one, particularly when such choice entices bearing relatively 
high sunk costs.  
 
We develop an illustrative theoretical model that shows how the combination between high risk 
aversion and low initial productivity may hinder family firms’ decision to enter foreign markets, 
particularly distant ones. We test this hypothesis for a sample of Italian companies. The problem is 
of great concern in Italy, where a large share of the firms are family owned. We do find that family 
ownership does indeed affect export choices in the expected way independently of productivity and 
other firm characteristics that influence export behaviour. We attribute this effect to risk aversion. 
Therefore we show that family management leads to a specific distribution of sales across markets: 
only because managed by the owners, these firms sell on average about 3 percent more output in the 
domestic market, 10 percent less in the close by European market and 12 percent less in the more 
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far away destinations19 than predicted by their characteristics such size, productivity and labour 
composition. This family bias is however smaller for larger and highly productive firms. If a family 
firm has a total factor productivity above the 90th percentile of the distribution then the negative 
effect in the European market is totally compensated while if a firm has a productivity above the 
95th percentile then also the bias on the more far away markets disappears20. 
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Appendix A1 
Table A1.1 Distribution by sector 
Ateco ( 2 digit) 
 
Share 
of family  
firms (%) 
Av. 
number  
of empl. 
    
15 food and drink industries 77.62 72.03 
16 tobacco industry 80.00 42.07 
17 textile industry 81.52 102.59 
18 manufacturing of clothing articles; preparation and dyeing of fur coats 86.55 124.43 
19 
manufacturing and tanning of leather; manufacture of travelling articles, bags, 
leather straps and footwear 89.69 75.59 
20 
wood and wooden and cork products, except furniture; manuf. of straw articles and 
plaiting mat. 88.18 56.19 
21 manufacturing of paper paste, paper and paper products 81.94 96.89 
22 publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded supports 81.02 93.82 
23 manufacture of coke , petroleum refineries, treating of nuclear fuels 71.43 165.41 
24 manufacture of chemical products and synthetic and artificial fibres 68.81 155.38 
25 manufacture of rubber articles and plastic materials 80.36 115.38 
26 manufacture of products of the working of non metalliferous mineral 81.36 113.63 
27 production of metal and manufacture of metallic products 74.49 157.74 
28 manufacture and working of metal products, except for machinery and plants 83.00 62.69 
29 
manufacture of mechanical machinery and equipment, including installation, 
assembly, repair and maintenance 76.41 146.83 
30 manufacture of office machinery, processors an data processing systems 81.88 153.08 
31 manufacture of electric machinery and equipment nec 74.45 155.57 
32 manufacture of radio and television equipment and equipment for communications 75.21 211.12 
33 Manuf. of medical equipment, precision equipment, optic instruments and clocks 73.36 195.90 
34 manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 72.29 330.87 
35 manufacture of other means of transport 65.56 423.61 
36 furniture manufacture; other manufacturing industries 83.37 86.91 
37 collection and preparation for recycling 50.00 92.90 
  
  
Total 79.40 118.18 
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Table A1.2 Premium regressions: Leverage 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
 
Leverage 
 
 
Leverage 
 
 
Leverage 
 
 
Leverage 
(no 
Bonds) 
 
leverage  
(no Bonds) 
 
Leverage 
(no Bonds) 
 
 
Credit 
constraint 
(dummy) 
 
Credit 
constraint 
(dummy) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
  
 
  
   
Family -0.020 -0.022 -0.021 -0.020 -0.022 -0.021 0.006 0.001 
  
[0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]** [0.003] 
TFP index  -0.016 -0.015  -0.017 -0.016  -0.028 
  
 [0.002]*** [0.003]***  [0.002]*** [0.003]***  [0.002]*** 
Cr constr.   0.058   0.059   
 
  [0.006]***   [0.006]***   
Constant 0.471 0.238 0.153 0.472 0.239 0.154 0.020 0.015 
  
[0.028]*** [0.058]*** [0.050]*** [0.028]*** [0.058]*** [0.050]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]** 
 
        
Obs.s 31072 30812 29995 31072 30812 29995 33003 30605 
R-squared 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.01 
Notes: All estimations include two-digit industry dummies, size controls and time dummies. 
          Robust standard errors in brackets  
           *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
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Table A1.3 Distribution of sales by destination.     
  
 Shares of Sales  by Destination 
 Destination of sales 
(share of firms) *       
  Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  
      
 
EU and RoW 
(47.19%) 
Share of sales to EU 15753 24.72 18.87 0.00 99.00 
 Share of sales to RoW 15753 20.55 19.43 0.00 98.01 
 Share of domestic sales 15753 54.73 27.36 0.00 100.00 
 
 
 
     
 
Only EU -and home 
(15.64%) 
Share of sales to EU 5221 24.78 25.76 0.00 100.00 
 Share of sales to RoW 5221 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Share of domestic sales 5221 75.22 25.76 0.00 100.00 
 
 
 
     
 
Only RoW - and home 
(4.98 %) 
Share of sales to EU 1663 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Share of sales to RoW 1663 28.64 29.46 0.10 100.00 
 Share of domestic sales 1663 71.36 29.46 0.00 99.90 
* 32.19% of firms sell only at home 
 
 
 
Table A1.4: Firm Characteristics by Destination of sales 
 
 
 
Not Exporters Exp to EU and ROW 
 
Exp only to Eu 
 
Exp only to ROW 
 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
 
             
Family 10743 0.85 0.35 15739 0.76 0.43 5219 0.82 0.38 1663 0.81 0.39 
Sh of Indep. Man. 10735 0.14 0.27 15727 0.29 0.36 5215 0.20 0.31 1662 0.20 0.31 
Employment 10745 48.96 149.59 15753 156.61 496.26 5221 82.24 195.30 1663 66.01 128.10 
TFP_index 9882 0.83 0.41 14779 1.00 0.54 4772 0.90 0.47 1508 0.86 0.44 
Leverage 9702 0.17 0.20 14659 0.23 0.19 4729 0.21 0.20 1499 0.21 0.19 
Var of profits(t, t-3) 8607 36.18 314.68 13086 51.73 330.83 4186 48.09 231.34 1327 51.55 232.38 
Sh of cr. constrained firms 10574 0.05 0.23 15464 0.04 0.20 5140 0.04 0.20 1636 0.05 0.21 
Age 10649 24.63 76.14 15580 28.40 67.76 5144 16.70 437.26 1624 26.19 21.39 
White blue sh. 
 
10525 0.57 3.70 15653 0.63 2.48 5183 0.49 1.65 1642 0.58 1.01 
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Table 4   Benchmark equation 
  
Dep. Var.: Value of sales to j 
(EU, RoW, Home) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
    
EU dummy -1.331 -1.281 -0.542 -0.553 
 
[0.014]*** [0.016]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
RoW Dummy -1.674 -1.620 -0.748 -0.761 
 
[0.017]*** [0.020]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]*** 
Lnempl 0.013 0.006   
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]***   
Lnempl*EU 0.200 0.187   
 
[0.003]*** [0.004]***   
Lnempl*RoW 0.233 0.219   
 
[0.004]*** [0.004]***   
Lntfp  0.030 -0.053 -0.048 
 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Lntfp*EU  0.071 0.256 0.246 
 
 [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** 
Lntfp*RoW  0.077 0.303 0.290 
 
 [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** 
Share of foreign ownership    -0.001 
 
   [0.000]*** 
Share of foreign ownership*EU    0.002 
 
   [0.000]*** 
Share of foreign ownership*RoW    0.003 
 
   [0.000]*** 
Lnage 0.028 0.023 0.023 0.024 
 
[0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Skill share -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Empl in R&D 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Constant 2.262 2.330 2.651 2.246 
 
[0.112]*** [0.111]*** [0.111]*** [0.149]*** 
 
    
Size dummies No No  Yes Yes 
 
    
Observations 97585 90580 90586 90184 
Pseudo Rsq 0.1749 0.1751 0.1638 0.1648 
Notes: 
Columns (1) to (4)  report the coefficients for the regressors as estimated by Poisson maximum likelihood estimator; 
All estimations include two-digit industry dummies and time dummies. 
Robust standard errors in brackets *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
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Table A1.5 Family and Trade (additional controls)  
 
 
Dep Var: Value of sales to j (EU, RoW, Home) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
        
EU dummy -0.461 -0.340 -0.518 -0.564 -0.459 -0.463 -0.344 -0.449 
 
[0.010]*** [0.017]*** [0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.022]*** [0.030]*** 
RoW Dummy -0.628 -0.636 -0.888 -1.020 -0.625 -0.634 -0.633 -0.865 
 
[0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.014]*** [0.016]*** [0.022]*** [0.023]*** [0.022]*** [0.030]*** 
Family 0.066 0.038 0.010 -0.003 0.099 0.094 0.074 0.018 
 
[0.007]*** [0.006]*** [0.005]** [0.005] [0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.019]*** [0.019] 
Family*EU -0.164 -0.078 -0.054 -0.016 -0.185 -0.177 -0.103 -0.038 
 
[0.020]*** [0.019]*** [0.019]*** [0.019] [0.033]*** [0.033]*** [0.032]*** [0.032] 
Family*RoW -0.212 -0.192 -0.123 -0.028 -0.235 -0.220 -0.221 -0.062 
 
[0.024]*** [0.025]*** [0.024]*** [0.024] [0.040]*** [0.041]*** [0.040]*** [0.040] 
Lntfp -0.041 -0.023 0.006 0.014 -0.082 -0.084 -0.064 -0.050 
 
[0.005]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]* [0.004]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** 
Lntfp*EU 0.199 0.123 0.088 0.079 0.185 0.187 0.107 0.092 
 
[0.015]*** [0.015]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.023]*** [0.023]*** [0.020]*** [0.020]*** 
Lntfp*RoW 0.242 0.252 0.156 0.124 0.227 0.231 0.223 0.169 
 
[0.018]*** [0.019]*** [0.018]*** [0.017]*** [0.028]*** [0.028]*** [0.027]*** [0.026]*** 
Lntfp*family -0.006 0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.053 -0.051 -0.044 -0.040 
 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.013]*** 
Lntfp*family *EU 0.060 0.048 0.049 0.047 0.080 0.078 0.071 0.066 
 
[0.015]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.023]*** [0.023]*** [0.022]*** [0.021]*** 
Lntfp*family *RoW 0.054 0.043 0.045 0.046 0.075 0.071 0.069 0.067 
 
[0.019]*** [0.019]** [0.018]** [0.017]*** [0.029]*** [0.029]** [0.028]** [0.027]** 
Credit constraint -0.003 -0.027   0.035 -0.032   
 
[0.006] [0.014]*   [0.023] [0.046]   
Credit constraint*EU -0.033 0.076   -0.036 0.081   
 
[0.022] [0.040]*   [0.040] [0.070]   
Credit constraint*RoW -0.010 0.189   -0.014 0.191   
 
[0.027] [0.046]***   [0.050] [0.085]**   
Credit const.*family  0.029    0.079   
 
 [0.015]*    [0.051]   
Credit const.*family *EU  -0.138    -0.142   
 
 [0.047]***    [0.083]*   
Cr. const.*family *RoW  -0.253    -0.257   
 
 [0.056]***    [0.102]**   
Listed   0.018    -0.044  
 
  [0.008]**    [0.053]  
Listed*EU   -0.038    0.040  
 
  [0.026]    [0.055]  
Listed*Row   0.059    0.225  
 
  [0.030]**    [0.064]***  
Sh of indep management    -0.028    -0.143 
 
   [0.004]***    [0.017]*** 
Sh of indep manag.*EU    0.111    0.183 
 
   [0.015]***    [0.027]*** 
Sh of indep manag.*RoW    0.272    0.434 
 
   [0.017]***    [0.032]*** 
Constant 2.627 2.591 2.258 2.219     
 
[0.112]*** [0.115]*** [0.144]*** [0.144]***     
Firm FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
        
Observations 88756 88756 89668 90151 88755 88755 89668 90151 
Notes: 
All estimations include controls (not reported) for Age of the firm, workers’ skill ratio, employment in R&D, Share of foreign ownership (also 
interacted with destination dummies) in addition to size dummies two-digit industry dummies and time dummies.   
Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, 
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Appendix A2: Sample Description 
Capitalia’s Observatory on Small and Medium Size Firms conducts every three years a survey on a 
representative sample of Italian firms. In this paper we use a dataset obtained by merging the three 
most recent waves of the survey, 1998, 2001 and 2004. The three surveys include respectively 
4497, 4680 and 4277 firms.  
The sample is selected with a stratified design on location, industrial activity and size for all firms 
with less than 500 employees. While all firms with more than 500 employees are included in each 
wave.  
We removed from the sample firms with inconsistencies or missing values on all the variables of 
interests. In addition, the first and the last percentiles have been used as lower and upper thresholds 
for the trimming procedure to exclude the extreme values. 
The following table describes the structure of the unbalanced panel of 7363 firms that is been used 
in the estimations. 
 
 
Table A2.1 Structure of the sample 
Years (survey) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) tot 
2003-01 1726 1353 626    252 3957 
2000-98  1353 626 654 760   3393 
1997-95   626 654  1992 252 3524 
Balance Sheet 2003-1992 2003-1992 2003-1992 2000-1992 2000-1992 1998-1992 2003-1992  
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Appendix A3: Family firm definition 
 
Inspecting those 547 firms that are managed by the founder and/or the family but have no private 
ownership we find that 198 firms are for more than 95% owned by service (or public) firms, 188 
firms are for more than 95% owned by banks or financial institutions and 187 firms are for more 
than 95% owned by foreign firms/individuals. Looking at the distribution by size there is not a clear 
pattern being those excluded firms evenly distributed across size classes.  
 
Table A3.1 Distribution of firms and ownership by size.  
 
N. of firms Share of firms 
Share of firms owned for more than 95% by 
 
Foreign 
firms/Individuals 
Financial 
institutions/Banks 
Service 
firms 
   
   
Less than 20 employees 77 0.13 0.31 0.52 0.17 
Between 21 and 50  employees 113 0.20 0.35 0.43 0.22 
Between  51 and 250  employees 172 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.39 
Between  251 and 499 employees 103 0.18 0.26 0.26 0.47 
More than 500 employees  109 0.19 0.40 0.22 0.38 
 
     
Total 574 1.00 0.32 0.33 0.35 
 
 
Table A3.2 shows some of the main regressions where the family dummy includes also those 574 
firms and the results are substantially unchanged. 
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Table A3.2  Family and Trade (alternative definition of family) 
  
 Dep Var: Value of sales to j (EU, RoW, Home) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
EU dummy -0.460 -0.623 -0.333 -1.128 -0.458 -0.449 
 
[0.009]*** [0.011]*** [0.017]*** [0.031]*** [0.017]*** [0.018]*** 
RoW Dummy -0.621 -0.875 -0.620 -1.375 -0.620 -0.611 
 
[0.011]*** [0.014]*** [0.012]*** [0.037]*** [0.021]*** [0.022]*** 
Family 0.065 0.033 0.043 0.068 0.058 0.113 
 
[0.004]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.010]*** [0.013]*** [0.020]*** 
Family*EU -0.113 -0.126 -0.093 -0.314 -0.115 -0.208 
 
[0.010]*** [0.020]*** [0.019]*** [0.036]*** [0.018]*** [0.033]*** 
Family*RoW -0.172 -0.153 -0.217 -0.426 -0.174 -0.264 
 
[0.013]*** [0.024]*** [0.025]*** [0.043]*** [0.023]*** [0.040]*** 
Lntfp -0.042 -0.006 -0.022  -0.107 -0.078 
 
[0.003]*** [0.004] [0.004]***  [0.008]*** [0.010]*** 
Lntfp*EU 0.234 0.137 0.120  0.228 0.173 
 
[0.010]*** [0.015]*** [0.015]***  [0.017]*** [0.022]*** 
Lntfp*RoW 0.271 0.147 0.244  0.264 0.211 
 
[0.012]*** [0.018]*** [0.019]***  [0.020]*** [0.027]*** 
Lntfp*family  -0.003 0.001   -0.055 
 
 [0.004] [0.005]   [0.014]*** 
Lntfp*family *EU  0.062 0.051   0.092 
 
 [0.015]*** [0.014]***   [0.023]*** 
Lntfp*family *RoW  0.057 0.050   0.089 
 
 [0.018]*** [0.019]***   [0.029]*** 
Credit constraint   -0.032    
 
  [0.014]**    
Credit constraint*EU   0.085    
 
  [0.040]**    
Credit constraint*RoW   0.213    
 
  [0.045]***    
Credit const.*family   0.035    
 
  [0.015]**    
Credit const.*family *EU   -0.147    
 
  [0.047]***    
Cr. const.*family *RoW   -0.280    
 
  [0.055]***    
Lnempl    0.024   
 
   [0.002]***   
Lnempl*EU    0.151   
 
   [0.006]***   
Lnempl*RoW    0.170   
 
   [0.007]***   
Lnempl*family    -0.016   
 
   [0.002]***   
Lnempl*family *EU    0.079   
 
   [0.007]***   
Lnempl*family *RoW    0.095   
 
   [0.009]***   
Constant 2.159 2.289 2.187 2.216 .  
 
[0.150]*** [0.145]*** [0.160]*** [0.112]***   
 
      
 
      
Firm fixed effects NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Observations 90505 90505 89077 97490 90183 90183 
       
Notes: 
Coefficients for the regressors as estimated by Poisson maximum likelihood estimator; All estimations include controls (not reported) for Age 
of the firm, workers’ skill ratio, employment in R&D, Share of foreign ownership (also interacted with destination dummies) in addition to 
size dummies (except for columns 6 and 7) two-digit industry dummies and time dummies.   
Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, 
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Appendix A4: Measure of Total Factor Productivity 
 
The measure of productivity used in this paper is Total Factor Productivity obtained as difference 
between the actual output and the one predicted by means of sectoral (by two-digit industry)  
production function estimations. Under the assumption of Hicks neutral Cobb Douglas technology 
we use logarithmic approximation of the value added21 production function where number of 
workers and capital stock are inputs. To solve the well known simultaneity bias22 we proxy for 
unobserved productivity shocks with material inputs as suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)23.  
The dataset does not include information on physical quantities so we use the nominal values of 
output or inputs. Therefore we make use of yearly deflators from ISTAT (2005) “Conti Economici 
1970-2004. For output we have sectoral wholesale price deflators while for capital and materials we 
use sectoral input price deflators. 
Finally to compare productivity across firms, we construct a TFP Index dividing, for each firm, the 
exponential value of TFP by the respective year, industry and class size average. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
21
 Calculated as gross output net of services and material costs. 
22
 Marschak and Andrews (1944). 
23
 We also tried using the separate information on Investments as a proxy as suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) but 
given that this methodology is valid only when firms report non-zero investments this would imply a severe truncation 
of our sample. 
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